Chapter published in:Surprise at the Intersection of Phenomenology and Linguistics
Edited by Natalie Depraz and Agnès Celle
[Consciousness & Emotion Book Series 11] 2019
► pp. 78–90
How implicit is surprise?
Confronting a phenomenological description with a radical pragmatist approach
As if it challenged the subject, surprise upsets somebody’s routine: it hastes one to realize how he usually thinks and acts, if it still fits with reality after that surprising event, even if he must create other ways of thinking and acting. Is surprise an experience that makes me aware of an implicit world which suddenly appears through a surprising event? Or, does surprise question that world as taken for granted, by constraining the subject to assess his implicit way of experiencing the world? Surprise is not always what happens in the underlying intentionality. In a practical sense, surprise is a kind of reality check: it urges to go back to reality. Describing the implicit intentionality in my lived experience, this paper aims at asking to what extent a surprising experience converges with the implicit world the subject takes for granted: firstly, thanks to a phenomenological approach of surprise as an implicit lived experience (Husserl, Schutz); secondly, by crossing that phenomenological description with a pragmatist approach (Dewey, Peirce), namely the radical Peirce’s thesis on surprise as a challenging experience; finally, by dealing with differences between phenomenology and pragmatism about the relation between emotion and cognition, subject’s self-control and passivity.
Keywords: surprise, implicit, emotion, cognition, phenomenology, pragmatism
Published online: 06 November 2019
Cooke, E. F.
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Libera, A. (de), Rosier, I. & Nef, F.
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