Article published in:
The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory
Edited by Steven M. Miller
[Advances in Consciousness Research 92] 2015
► pp. 372–399

Constitution, realization and identity

Empirical implications for three theories of the metaphysics of consciousness

In this paper I will discuss the kinds of dependence relation that philosophers have suggested may obtain between neural events and conscious events; between Ns and Cs. The three candidate relations that I will spend the most time discussing are constitution, realization, and identity. There are other candidates for the mind/body relation, but these will serve as the major options. Indeed, these are already more than three options, because philosophers do not agree on the best way to understand constitution; still less to understand realization.
Published online: 17 June 2015
https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.92.16kea
Cited by

Cited by 1 other publications

Polák, Michal & Tomáš Marvan
2018. Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity. Frontiers in Psychology 9 Crossref logo

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