Article published in:The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory
Edited by Steven M. Miller
[Advances in Consciousness Research 92] 2015
► pp. 330–347
The status of consciousness in nature
The most central metaphysical question about phenomenal consciousness is that of what constitutes phenomenal consciousness, whereas the most central epistemic question about consciousness is that of whether science can eventually provide an explanation of the phenomenon. Many philosophers have argued that science doesn’t have the means to answer the question of what consciousness is (the explanatory gap) but that consciousness nonetheless is fully determined by the physical facts underlying it (no ontological gap). Others have argued that the explanatory gap in the sciences entails an ontological gap. This position is also known as ‘property dualism’. Here I examine a fourth position, according to which there an ontological gap but no explanatory gap.
Published online: 17 June 2015
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