Mind Ascribed

An elaboration and defence of interpretivism

| University of Tartu
HardboundAvailable
ISBN 9789027252166 | EUR 99.00 | USD 149.00
 
e-Book
ISBN 9789027287748 | EUR 99.00 | USD 149.00
 
This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Mölder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed against interpretivism, the book provides a critical analysis of major alternative accounts of mental state possession as well as the interpretivist ideas originating from Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. The viability of the approach is demonstrated by showing how one can treat mental causation as well as the faculties closely connected with consciousness – perception and the awareness of one’s own mental states – in the interpretivist framework. (Series A)
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 80]  2010.  xii, 293 pp.
Publishing status: Available
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
xi–xii
Chapter 1. Preliminaries
1–16
Part I. Towards interpretivism
Chapter 2. How not to have a mind
19–74
Chapter 3. Interpretivism
75–128
Part II. Elaborating and defending the ascription theory
Chapter 4. Folk psychology and mental terms
131–150
Chapter 5. The ascription theory
151–184
Chapter 6. Objections and defence
185–204
Part III. Extending the view
Chapter 7. Interpretivism and mental causation
207–232
Chapter 8. Perception
233–256
Chapter 9. Self-knowledge
257–274
Chapter 10. Conclusion
275–278
References
279–290
Index
291–293
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This list is based on CrossRef data as of 07 february 2021. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers. Any errors therein should be reported to them.

Subjects

Consciousness Research

Consciousness research

Philosophy

Philosophy
BIC Subject: HPM – Philosophy of mind
BISAC Subject: PHI015000 – PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body
U.S. Library of Congress Control Number:  2010028101 | Marc record