The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness

| University of Calgary
HardboundAvailable
ISBN 9789027252081 | EUR 99.00 | USD 149.00
 
e-Book
ISBN 9789027291684 | EUR 99.00 | USD 149.00
 
Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, “implicit” awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or “what-it-is-like,” dimension of conscious experience, defending the innovative thesis that phenomenal character is constituted by the implicit self-awareness built into every conscious state. This account stands in marked contrast to most influential extant theories of phenomenal character, including qualia theories, according to which phenomenal character is a matter of having phenomenal sensations, and representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is constituted by representational content. (Series A)
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 72]  2008.  vii, 186 pp.
Publishing status: Available
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction
1–9
Chapter 2. Some semantics of "consciousness"
11–32
Chapter 3. A formula for state consciousness
33–57
Chapter 4. Consciousness and self-awareness
59–84
Chapter 5. Higher-orderism
85–102
Chapter 6. A "one-state" alternative
103–135
Chapter 7. Representationalism
137–154
Chapter 8. The nature of phenomenal character
155–172
Bibliography
173–182
“Janzen's account [...] provides a solid and admirably lean critique of contemporary accounts of consciousness and its phenomenal character.”
Cited by

Cited by 11 other publications

No author info given
2020.  In Was heißt es, wach zu sein?,  pp. 219 ff. Crossref logo
Kelly Becker & Iain D. Thomson
2019.  In The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015, Crossref logo
Farrell, Jonathan
2018. Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness. Philosophical Studies 175:11  pp. 2743 ff. Crossref logo
JANZEN, GREG
2011. IN DEFENSE OF THE WHAT-IT-IS-LIKENESS OF EXPERIENCE. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49:3  pp. 271 ff. Crossref logo
Janzen, Greg
2013. An adverbialist–objectualist account of pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12:4  pp. 859 ff. Crossref logo
Peebles, Graham
2018. Reflexive theories of consciousness and unconscious perception. Philosophical Psychology 31:1  pp. 25 ff. Crossref logo
Peters, Frederic
2014. Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues. Axiomathes 24:4  pp. 441 ff. Crossref logo
Roberts, Michael
2018. Phenomenological constraints: a problem for radical enactivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17:2  pp. 375 ff. Crossref logo
Stoljar, Daniel
2016. The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness. Mind 125:500  pp. 1161 ff. Crossref logo
Stoljar, Daniel
2018. The Regress Objection to Reflexive Theories of Consciousness. Analytic Philosophy 59:3  pp. 293 ff. Crossref logo
Textor, Mark
2013. Brentano on the dual relation of the mental. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12:3  pp. 465 ff. Crossref logo

This list is based on CrossRef data as of 07 february 2021. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers. Any errors therein should be reported to them.

Subjects

Consciousness Research

Consciousness research

Philosophy

Philosophy
BIC Subject: HPM – Philosophy of mind
BISAC Subject: PHI015000 – PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body
U.S. Library of Congress Control Number:  2007045723 | Marc record