Consciousness and Qualia

| University of Notre Dame, Indiana
PaperbackAvailable
ISBN 9789027251251 (Eur) | EUR 72.00
ISBN 9781556191855 (USA) | USD 108.00
 
e-Book
ISBN 9789027283498 | EUR 72.00 | USD 108.00
 
This is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc. Consciousness is analyzed as the having of qualia. Phenomenal properties or qualia are problematical because they lack appropriate bearers. The relation of having is problematical because none of the typical candidates for this relation — introspection, inner monitoring, higher level thoughts — is capable of explaining what it looks like to have a quale . The qualia problem is solved by introducing a bundle theory of phenomenal objects. Phenomenal objects are bundles of qualia. Thus there is no need for independent qualia bearers. The having problem is solved by introducing a bundle theory of the self. To have a quale is for it to be in the bundle one is. Thus no further relations are needed to explain how qualia are had. This study strives for phenomenological adequacy. Thus the first-person point of view dominates throughout. (Series A)
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 5]  1998.  x, 368 pp.
Publishing status: Available
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1
2. Making our Ideas Clear: Consciousness and Qualia
12
3. On Method: The First-Person Perspective
36
4. Higher-Order Representation and Introspection
59
5. The Allure of Introspectionism
93
6. Oscar, the Unconscious Introspector: A Case Study
129
7. Relocation Qualia
151
8. Having Relocated Qualia
181
9. Denying Relocated Qualia
214
10. consciousness: The Having of Qualia
262
Notes
311
References
332
Detailed Table of Contents
346
Index
352
Cited by

Cited by 21 other publications

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2013. Is property dualism better off than substance dualism?. Philosophical Studies 164:2  pp. 533 ff. Crossref logo
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2018.  In The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism,  pp. 22 ff. Crossref logo
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2011. IS CONSCIOUSNESS JUST CONSCIOUS BEHAVIOR?. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 03:02  pp. 353 ff. Crossref logo
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2020. Cognitive self-management requires the phenomenal registration of intrinsic state properties. Philosophical Studies 177:4  pp. 1113 ff. Crossref logo
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This list is based on CrossRef data as of 07 february 2021. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers. Any errors therein should be reported to them.

Subjects

Consciousness Research

Consciousness research

Philosophy

Philosophy
BIC Subject: HP – Philosophy
BISAC Subject: PHI000000 – PHILOSOPHY / General
U.S. Library of Congress Control Number:  98014824 | Marc record